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Time for Decisions: The Climate Train 
Picks Up Steam for Copenhagen 
Christoph Bals, Larissa Neubauer1 
February 2009 
For climate politics, 2009 will be a year setting the switches for our future course. The 
prelude was given by the UN climate summit, which took place in Poznan shortly before the 
end of last year. There, the international "climate train" reached its minimum goals, creating 
the formal preconditions for the achievement of an ambitious post-2012 global deal twelve 
months later in Copenhagen. At the same time, it became clear that central players lack the 
political will to actually achieve this kind of wide-reaching international deal.    
 However, the US administration has sent a different signal in the first weeks of its time in 
office. One should be curious to see how much dynamic will unfold from the US this year. 
Particularly interesting is an initiative for an ambitious roadmap for the USA and China for 
national and international climate protection, launched by the US energy minister (himself of 
Chinese descent) before his appointment.2 It would be a piece of staircase wit for history, if 
the EU got weak knees in the fight against climate change now, and became dependent on 
these two countries for renewable energies and energy efficient technology, instead of joining 
in and creating this new dynamic. 
  Given the positions and personnel of the new US as well Chinese governments, both of 
which are recognizing more and more the risks of climate change, it no longer seems 
impossible that the USA, China and the EU, alone or in consultation with each other, could 
present a really ambitious climate plan, with a willingness for serious climate protection 
action "at home", and a large-scale cooperation, as well as strategic inputs, i.e. offer of 
support and cooperation, for the international climate negotiations.        
 The UN climate negotiations need this kind of impulse; as this chapter demonstrates, 
outlining the current situation in the negotiations and giving, furthermore, a perspective on the 
steps, which still need to be taken on the way to Copenhagen.   
The state of affairs at the UN negotiations after the Climate Summit in Poznan  
It became particularly clear at the UN climate summit in Poland that many industrialized 
countries remain unwilling to seriously negotiate on the reduction of their emissions between 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank in particular Jan Burck, Kristin Gerber, Sven Harmeling, Gerold Kier, Klaus 
Milke, Cheng Qian, Udo Simonis, Thomas Spencer, Manfred Treber and Hendrik Vygen for their 
constructive comments on drafts of this paper and Thomas Spencer for the translation. 
2 Asia Society, Pew Center, Center on U.S.-China Relations, January 2009: Common Challenge, 
Collaborative Response, A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change; 
January 2009. 
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24-40 percent by 2020 compared to 1990. This range reflects the recommendations of the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in order to keep a global temperature rise to 
less than 2ºC above pre-industrial levels. In this regard, the EU, Norway and Switzerland 
were positive exceptions.    
 Apart from this, almost all industrialized countries lacked the willingness to enter into the 
necessary scale of financial and technology cooperation with the countries of the South. This 
is, however, absolutely crucial, as the mandate of the Climate Conference in Bali tied the 
scale of climate protection activities in emerging economies and developing countries to the 
extent of this cooperation. Again, Norway and Switzerland formed the exception to this rule, 
while the EU on the other hand had too little to offer in this regard.     
 The difficult negotiations on financing climate change thus threw their first shadows over 
the future process. The developing countries did not succeed in pushing through negotiations 
on additional financing for the adaptation fund for the period up to 2012.3 When monetized, 
this fund will support the developing countries in adapting to the unavoidable consequences 
of climate change. Likewise, they failed to anchor in the closing statement 'a willingness to 
negotiate' on a large-scale finance mechanism for the period after 2012. Many developing 
countries expressed their massive disappointment that their efforts were blocked by 
industrialized nations:  
 "I must say this is one of the saddest moments I have witnessed in all these years", said 
Prodipto Ghosh, negotiator for India for 12 years. He further criticized "the refusal of some 
parties to experience a minuscule loss of profits from trading in carbon at a time when climate 
change is stripping the poor of their homes, hearts and their meagre loaves of bread." 
However, it has to be said that weaknesses in the strategic approach of developing countries 
and emerging economies contributed to the failure of this first attempt. These were so obvious 
that many observers suspected that the strategy was deliberately aimed at failure in order to be 
able to crank up the pressure on this negotiating theme before the decisive summit in 
Copenhagen.    
 However, there were certain steps forward in the area of adaptation. The adaptation fund 
was made 'ready for work'. This is an extremely innovative fund, both concerning its 
governance structure, where developing countries have a majority of votes, its financing 
system through a levy on the CDM – the first environmental levy ever - and the allocation of 
funds, whereby developing countries have direct access, being able to apply for funding 
without having to go through an international agency. It is currently provided with relatively 
little money, but many observers expect it to set a crucial precedent for a much larger-scale 
finance architecture in the Copenhagen agreement. There was also agreement on the fund's 
legal form.  
 Moreover, there were very constructive suggestions for risk management and international 
insurance models for those particularly vulnerable to climate change. The model of the 
                                                 
3 The Bali Mandate concerns the period before and after 2012. This should make it possible to begin 
immediately with both climate protection and adaptation, instead of delaying serious action until 2013. 
At the same time, early measures should serve in building trust in the process of negotiating and then 
ratifying a new agreement.   
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Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII)4 envisages, on the one hand, insurance for 
developing countries against large-scale weather damages, financed by nations responsible for 
climate change; and on the other hand, support for micro-insurance and similar instruments. 
This concept was reflected in the assembly text put together by the chairs, which itself will 
build the basis for future negotiation texts. 
 This is also true of a joint submission by Germanwatch, "Bread for the World" and CARE 
on a human rights-based approach to adaptation, using the procedural and legal aspects of the 
human right to food and water, in order to keep adaptation activities focused on the 
particularly vulnerable, without including an additional element of conditionality to 
adaptation support.      
 Despite these successes the fact is: the international climate train is not on the right track, 
lacking the necessary speed and scale of ambition. This could certainly change if the USA, 
China, and the EU, but also Australia and others, actually organize a 'green new deal' to save 
the economy and the climate. Massive investments in energy efficiency, renewable energies, 
and their necessary infrastructure could deliver a threefold dividend. Firstly, they are very 
labour intensive, creating jobs and spurring the economy. Secondly, money saved from the 
oil, gas and coal bill can be invested more rationally for the benefit of the economy and the 
climate. Thirdly, this would be the beginning of the age of serious climate protection. If, 
however, these hundreds of millions of Euros (and Dollars, and Chinese Renminbi Yan) are 
invested not for but rather against climate protection, the climate train perhaps may have left 
the rails. As these words are being written, there are indications that at least in the USA and 
China some elements of the necessary restructuring are contained in the stimulus packages.  
  Apart from this, it is of special importance that industrialized countries engage massively 
in large-scale finance and technology cooperation. Without this, there will never be a 
groundbreaking agreement between emerging economies and developing countries. Limiting 
the global temperature increase to as far below 2°C as possible would become practically 
unachievable.  
The Parties Still Lack a "Shared Vision" 
We are still far from developing a "Shared Vision" on the new agreement's ambition and 
architecture, or its elements designed in a way to trigger positive feed-back impulses towards 
implementation. 
 With the debate on greenhouse gas reductions targets, it is increasingly encouraging that 
more and more nations support the 2°C limit: next to its already well-known supporters - the 
EU, Norway, Iceland, African Nations and Chile - the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) is campaigning for a far more ambitious goal of 1.5 degrees; for understandable 
reasons too, given their special vulnerability. The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are 
currently discussing whether they will join in demanding a 1.5 degree limit to climate change; 
in the meantime they support a position "below two degrees". The IPCC's Chairman, 
Rajendra Pachauri, argued in his speech at the Poznan summit's opening ceremony that a 2°C 
limit would not be enough to avoid dangerous climate change. And for the first time, at a 
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much-applauded appearance in Poznan, Al Gore publicly threw his support behind a 350ppm5 
goal which would also aim towards limiting temperature rise to approximately 1.5 degrees. 
 On the last day of the conference, the global youth representatives presented a pledge 
signed by 80 countries stating that "the survival of every country is not negotiable", i.e. we 
must make our global climate targets ambitious enough to ensure the survival of all nations 
and all peoples. With current emissions development, this is an extremely ambitious position; 
however, with the current speed of sea level rise several dozen small island states would 
disappear in the coming decades.    
 The leading role of ever more developing countries in pushing for a very strong global 
target shows their frustration at, firstly, the reluctant attitude of industrialized countries, but 
secondly also at the reserved behaviour of the large emerging economies (particularly India, 
partly China) regarding the setting of their own reduction goals.6     
 The current emissions trends show that in the last several years greenhouse gas emissions 
have clearly accelerated. Without a dramatic political correction we cannot expect that the 
peak of global emissions will be reached by 2020 and that a stark reduction will occur 
thereafter. No country is presently on the necessary emissions path. This is why the first three 
places of the Climate Protection Index7, presented by Germanwatch in Poznan, remained 
open. Due to the economic crisis we can probably expect a temporary collapse in emissions 
levels. However, this will not last; and secondly, this is not exactly the low-carbon model of 
prosperity which motivates us to climate protection.   
The First Negotiating Track in the UN Convention Framework 
The UN climate negotiations are presently taking place along two tracks. On the one hand, we 
are dealing with the extension of the Kyoto Protocol into a second commitment period after 
2012. The second, more significant track, aims at further concretizing the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which was created in 1992. This double structure has three 
main reasons: 
 Firstly, the USA was the only industrialized country not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and 
hence they can’t negotiate formally in the "Kyoto track". Secondly, much of the long-
negotiated Kyoto architecture with its binding reduction targets for developed countries -
furnished with harder targets - should continue after 2012. Thirdly, the emerging economies 
do not want to negotiate their "action plans" under the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. From the outset they want to make clear that they do not wish to deal in 
binding, economy-wide reduction targets.    
 
                                                 
5 Stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of emissions at a maximum of 350 ppm (ppm = parts per 
million) 
6 This also means: the position that the (emissions-) richest developing countries accept the largest 
obligations among the developing countries is not a consensus position. This could have consequences 
for the negotiation strategy.       
7 www.germanwatch.org/ccpi 
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Only when the negotiating position of the new US-administration is known, one will be able 
to assess whether there is still a chance of concluding one agreement in Copenhagen, or 
whether there will be two interlinked agreements.   
 The negotiations in the Framework Convention are divided into four negotiating "blocks", 
alongside the attempt to work out a "shared vision". The first of the four negotiating blocks 
concerns primarily the USA’s reduction target as well as the commitments to climate action 
by emerging economies. In these negotiations there have been some positive signals. The 
emerging economies and developing countries should accept in Copenhagen measurable, 
reportable and verifiable commitments to climate protection activities.    
 An increasing number of developing countries have announced their own targets or 
willingness to make substantial contributions. The announcements and activities of South 
Africa, China8, Mexico, but also those of Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica, and South Korea, 
are of particular weight in this regard.   
 However, as it was agreed at the Climate Summit in Bali, the scale of promised climate 
protection activities by emerging economies ultimately depends on the ambition with which 
industrialized countries commit themselves to likewise measurable, reportable, and verifiable 
finance and technology cooperation with the emerging economies and developing countries.   
 The new instrument to slow deforestation in the tropics (REDD)9 is being negotiated in the 
first negotiating block, "mitigation" as well. 
 Although the public discourse in industrialized countries is dominated by the negotiations 
on climate protection targets, the second negotiating block, adaptation, has developed to a 
pillar of almost equal importance. Here, a large-scale program to support those countries most 
vulnerable to climate change is planned, so that they can adapt to the gravest consequences of 
climate change. These activities should be primarily financed by the industrialized countries.   
 The third negotiating block in this working group under the Convention aims to structure 
the large-scale technology cooperation between industrialized and developing countries. 
Thereby it deals with the financing of climate action and forest protection, as well as 
adaptation and technology cooperation.    
 Up until the conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, a series of negotiations will 
prepare all of the central elements of the treaty. Therefore, it is crucially important that the 
Chairs of the negotiations have a strong mandate and are recognized by the countries. In the 
Convention working group, the previous Co-Chair, Michael Cutajar, will now be the Chair for 
the next twelve months. The former Executive Secretary of the UN climate secretariat is one 
of the best climate diplomats and seems to be exactly the right person for this crucial post. 
The previous chair, Luis Machado, will now be his deputy.  
 
                                                 
8 On new developments within the Chinese climate policy compare the Germanwatch discussion paper 
"A Portrait of China’s Climate Policy", http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/chin10e.htm 
9 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
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The Kyoto Working Group: The Climate Train for the Industrialized Countries is 
slowing down  
A second negotiating track exists alongside the Convention working group: the Kyoto 
working group is negotiating on a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. Within 
this framework there has been discussion on drastically increasing the industrial countries' 
emissions reduction targets for the time beyond 2012.10 The further development of the 
hitherto project-based emissions trading mechanism with emerging economies and 
developing countries is also being negotiated in this track. The Kyoto working group has not 
yet succeeded in choosing a new Chair – for now, Harald Dovland from Norway will remain 
Chair.  
 Although the Kyoto track achieved its minimum goal with a vague negotiation mandate, 
many negotiators were nonetheless disappointed. "It seems as though preparations were 
underway here for the great escape from Copenhagen", said the Chinese negotiator 
disgustedly at the end of the Poznan negotiations in the AWG-KP. Important industrialized 
countries - Canada, Japan, Russia, Australia - tried to duck out of committing themselves to 
the necessary ambitious targets (at least 25-40 percent for industrialized countries by 2020 
compared to 1990 levels). The AWG-KP merely succeeded in copying the wording of the 
Bali Summit referring to the relevant IPCC text. Thus, the chance remains, that serious targets 
will be negotiated. But it is still not clear if it actually happens.  
 During the negotiations Australia also announced its target spectrum. Australia accepted a 
5 percent reduction target by 2020 (compared to 2000) and is, in the context of an 
international agreement including the USA, prepared to ramp this target up to 15 percent. 
Thereby it is far from the necessary targets11, and, moreover, said absolutely nothing about 
financing climate protection in the emerging economies and developing countries.   
 The new President Barack Obama announced for the USA12 a return of their emissions to 
1990 levels by 2020. This is no small amount, given the fact that the USA's emissions have 
risen almost 20 percent since 1990. Yet all too many industrialized countries are now hiding 
behind this zero-percent-target (compared to 1990).  
 In its energy and climate package approved in December 2008, the EU affirmed its target 
of a 30 percent reduction by 2020 compared to 1990, in the event of an international 
agreement. The EU accepted a 20 percent reduction commitment regardless of the outcome 
from Copenhagen – since December this is a legally binding commitment for the EU. This is 
the most ambitious target of any industrialized country worldwide – Norway and Switzerland 
also support this goal. However, the 30 percent EU goal - even if all other industrialized 
                                                 
10 The US targets need to be negotiated within the other track (AWG-LCA), since they never ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol. But their targets need to be "comparable" to those of the other industrialized 
countries. 
11 25-40 percent reductions by 2020 compared to 1990, the overwhelming majority must be achieved 
domestically.  
12 Although the US targets are negotiated within the Convention Framework, since the US is not a 
party of the Kyoto Protocol, they have been included here to make them more comparable to other 
industrialized countries. 
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countries accepted this target- is not ambitious enough to remain under the two-degree limit 
the EU set itself.13 More than 50 percent of the emissions reductions can be achieved through 
project-based emissions trading in emerging economies and developing countries. To remain 
under the danger zone, i.e. the two degree limit, climate protection in emerging economies 
must occur, however, in addition to action in industrialized countries, and not instead. 
Moreover, the EU package creates incentives for the building of new coal power plants. These 
would stand in the way of the far more ambitious post-2020 reductions targets necessary for 
the pathway to stay below a global warming of two-degrees.  
 Understandably, the representative of the G77 and China cried out at the beginning of the 
high level segment: "If Europe sends a signal that they can make their targets only in 
prosperous times, what should the rest of the world say?"  
 Thus the climate train, in the context of the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, is stuck for 
now in the "Valley of Death". That comes, however, as no surprise. There may only be 
movement in this debate once the new US-administration has determined its negotiation 
strategy. Previously, all potential blockers will be hiding behind the US administration's broad 
back.  
 It could be that by the time this book goes to print there will be a new premier in Canada, 
as the current Stephen Harper is again fighting a crisis within his government. A possible 
change of government in Canada could unleash a really new, constructive dynamic there. As 
in Germany, a former minister of the environment could become the new head of state.   
 However: it will require enormous public pressure in all industrialized countries and happy 
fortuities with possible changes of government in Canada and Japan in the next few months, 
for the climate change train to actually pick up the necessary steam.   
 The winds of change coming from the US will be decisive, however. It would guarantee a 
breakthrough if the USA, the EU and China together took ambitious steps for their domestic 
climate protection and concluded a wide-reaching cooperation before Copenhagen. It is 
pleasing to see that some in the US consider this kind of approach.    
Possible bump in the road to Copenhagen: Differences in the Strategy for Reducing 
Deforestation.  
In the months before Poznan there was much dynamic in the debate on REDD, i.e. reducing 
emissions from deforestation and degradation. In 2004 emissions from the forest sector made 
up, according to the IPCC's fourth assessment report, 17.4 percent of total global 
anthropogenic emissions. The true value could be, however, even higher. This number only 
refers to 2004, and there are often variations in the rate of deforestation from year to year. 
Furthermore, new studies from Australia show that the IPCC accounting guidelines can 
                                                 
13 If the EU were to fulfil a 30 percent goal domestically, and to co-finance the necessary 
transformation in emerging economies additionally, this goal could just be sufficient. Firstly, however, 
it is still not clear whether the EU actually wants to ramp up the 20 percent reduction to 30 percent. 
Secondly, the EU wants to achieve a good half of its goal through emissions trading measures in the 
developing countries. The necessary climate action in these countries must take place additionally to 
the 30 percent goal of the industrialized countries, not instead of it.    
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significantly underestimate forest carbon14, although these results cannot be easily transferred 
to the global scale.    
 An effective mechanism for REDD is one of the most important building blocks for our 
ability to actually stabilize climate change well below 2 degrees. However - and many are 
trying to camouflage this primarily for obvious economic interests - there exists potential in 
REDD to change the whole climate agreement into an ineffective pseudo-treaty.  
 This can occur if the accounting rules don't reflect 'what the atmosphere really sees'. And 
this is by no means sure, as the Kyoto Protocol’s accounting rules for forest protection in 
industrialized countries leave significant loopholes open. For example, according to the 
accounting rules, industrialized countries do not have to account for the emissions when 
natural forests are converted into plantations. This is despite the fact that plantations sequester 
up to 80 percent less CO2 than natural forests (and contain much less biodiversity) – but on 
paper the emissions from plantation conversion are not registered. Not to mention that 
plantations are much less resistant to extreme weather events and the consequences of climate 
change. Brazil expresses the problem concisely: "You in the industrialized countries have 
given yourselves lousy rules for forest protection, and now you want perfect rules for REDD 
for us in developing countries". It is clear that only when the rules for the forest sector in 
developed countries are improved we can hope to get a serious forest protection mechanism in 
developing countries.   
  There exists the risk that these accounting rules (or rules for systematic non-accounting) 
will migrate to the new mechanism for REDD currently being negotiated. If this happens this 
kind of loophole will undermine the incentive to avoid real emissions from deforestation. 
Simultaneously it will set an incentive (!) to reduce biodiversity. This kind of strategy could 
be successful on paper, while at the same time undermining all efforts to limit climate change 
to less than two degrees. To illustrate this with an example: if Indonesia were to convert a 
further 10 percent of its forest area into palm oil plantations, this could release 4.3 billion tons 
of unaccounted CO2 emissions into the atmosphere. This is equivalent to roughly a 25 percent 
reduction target by 2020 for all the industrialized countries. On paper it would say: zero 
emissions from the conversion to plantations.  
 Thus, a central requirement must be: both under the Kyoto-Protocol's rules for 
industrialized countries and under new rules for REDD all emissions from the forest sector 
must be fully and immediately accounted for.  
 The second big risk with REDD is the inclusion of REDD in the emissions trading scheme 
to offset the reduction targets of industrialized countries. Then, however, the rainforest will be 
protected instead of implementing climate protection in the industrialized and developing 
countries. More forest protection would mean more coal power plants. What we need, 
however, is more forest protection and more climate protection.    
 It should come as no surprise if politicians announce at the end of 2009: we have actually 
pushed through ambitious targets to fight climate change (25-40 percent in the industrialized 
countries), and we also have a fine instrument for forest protection - and it will be all cheaper 
than we thought. If this means, however, that REDD is included in the emissions trading 
scheme to offset a target for industrialized countries of 30 percent or less, it would be an utter 
                                                 
14 See Mackey et al 2008: Green Carbon, Part 1. ANA, Canberra.  
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sell-out for the global climate. The explanation is simple. Even if starting today hardly any 
more trees were uprooted, greenhouse gas emissions would have to be reduced drastically and 
quickly. If, however, forest protection delivers the smoke-screen, behind which business as 
usual continues in the energy and industry sector, then we are leading ourselves with certainty 
by the hand to a temperature rise of far more than two degrees. Still worse, we would lock 
ourselves for decades into a high emissions pathway: in the coming years, according to 
current planning, a huge number of coal power plants will be built, emitting enormous 
quantities of greenhouse gases for more than 40 years. And because these will be built before 
2020, CCS technology would not be able to change much. This technology will be technically 
scalable only around 2020. Even then it could be that it will be implemented only for newly 
built power plans – given the very high costs, it remains in question whether existing plants 
would be retrofitted.  
 It should be mentioned as a side note here that with a temperature rise of more than three 
degrees the risk increases drastically that large parts of the Amazon Rainforest will collapse. 
This shows the contrariness of a strategy to replace climate protection with forest protection, 
gambling with both the climate and the forest.  
 Whoever rejects the inclusion of forest protection in emissions trading must make sure that 
we succeed in getting another finance mechanism with sufficient funds. Thereby, the 
necessary funds can certainly come from the emissions trading scheme – as long as this 
doesn’t replace other climate action. The revenues from the auctioning of emissions rights 
and/or a levy from international aviation and maritime transform are potential sources of 
funds.     
 It was clear, however, that the big question of the inclusion of REDD in the emissions 
trading scheme would remain on ice in Poznan. This will be decided upon only in 
Copenhagen. The goal of Poznan was, however, the clarification of crucial principles for 
forest protection. This goal was not achieved. Moreover, it was a great disappointment that 
the negotiations did not succeed in anchoring rules for the protection of biodiversity in the 
final text in Poznan. And spontaneous demonstrations broke out as the attempt to anchor the 
rights of indigenous peoples in the text failed. According to previous experience, cooperation 
with the indigenous peoples is a fundamental prerequisite for the effective protection of 
tropical forests. 
Despite Progress on Details, a Growing Gulf in the Implementation of Adaptation to 
Climate Change  
The developing countries are affected the most by climate change - the fourth edition of the 
Climate Risk Index15, presented by Germanwatch at Poznan, illustrates this particularly 
clearly. The climate summit in Copenhagen will strive for agreement on industrialized 
countries' support for adaptation to climate change in the most vulnerable developing 
countries. In Poznan, this topic stood on the agenda in both negotiation tracks and the results 
thereof were mixed. The biggest success was an agreement bringing the Kyoto Protocol's 
adaptation fund closer to its full operationalization. After day-long negotiations dealing 
                                                 
15 www.germanwatch.org/cri 
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primarily with legal questions, it was determined to give the fund's executive board additional 
"legal capacities", so that it can directly conclude contracts with developing countries, so that 
these don’t always have to apply for money through institutions like the World Bank or other 
development banks. Developing countries lobbied strongly for the practical implementation 
of "direct access"16, first decided upon in the Bali Action Plan. However, there are still several 
questions to clarify here. For observers there was food for thought, in so far as the 
negotiations were obviously characterized by insufficient communication between parties 
(e.g. between the constructive countries of the G77 and China as well as the EU), as was 
reported from different sides. Given the challenges we still face, this was a warning signal. In 
addition to the negotiations, the important actors must consult intensively with each other, in 
order to avoid unnecessary frictions. 
 After many years of negotiations, important decisions were reached on the adaptation fund 
in Poznan. For example, for the first time in the history of the Convention/Kyoto process it 
was determined that developing countries must provide for the needs of the most vulnerable 
people in their countries when submitting projects to the adaptation fund. This must now be 
more concretely institutionalized. If all goes well, the first projects could be accepted by this 
innovative fund before Copenhagen. 
 A pleasing dynamic was also seen in the workshop on new insurance mechanisms. 
Financed by the countries causing climate change, these could cover the consequences of 
large-scale weather catastrophes. Debate on a climate insurance facility supporting the 
establishment and financing of climate-focused micro-insurance and other insurance products 
in developing countries stirred up keen interest at the conference.  
 There was, however, less progress in other negotiating issues on adaptation in the Kyoto 
Protocol track. There were very interesting documents on the table, but the negotiations broke 
down and were deferred until June 2009. We will see if more dynamic arises then. Given the 
ever stronger consequences of climate change, a much more comprehensive, post-2012 
cooperation and financing mechanism for adaptation strategies must be agreed upon in 
Copenhagen – and much more generous support must be given to those countries most 
affected by climate change, beginning straight after Copenhagen. 
Conflict in Technology and Finance Cooperation 
As expected, technology and finance cooperation became, the biggest point of conflict at the 
Poznan summit.   
 At the end of 2007, the emerging economies succeeded in Bali in coupling the level of 
ambition in climate mitigation in their own country to corresponding technology and finance 
cooperation with industrialized countries. That means: no large-scale technology cooperation, 
no ambitious climate activities by emerging economies. But also the other way round: no will 
to undertake ambitious climate activities, no large-scale technology cooperation. The EU also 
arrived with a very measly conceptualization in the technology area, falling well below the 
expectations of the emerging economies and developing countries. By reading the EU 
                                                 
16 Direct access means that an organisation from developing countries can directly apply for money 
without having to go through an international agency (UNDP, Development Bank or similar).   
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submission17 one believes that the EU wants to carry out technology cooperation mostly 
bilateral and within old tracks. 
 The group of developing countries and the emerging economies (G77 and China) is 
pushing for new, additional and multilateral structures and institutions in the framework of 
the climate convention, which legally obligate those who cause climate change. They expect 
that new, annual financial flows in the range of 0.5 to 1 percent of the industrialized countries' 
GDP, additional to developing aid, will be made available for climate protection (some 200-
400 billion US dollars). Many emerging economies (particularly South Africa, China, 
Mexico) are making it clear that they are prepared to undertake wide-reaching climate 
protection activities if the corresponding finance and technology cooperation is implemented. 
However, they are prepared to discuss binding country-wide limits or reduction targets only 
for the period after 2020.  
 In the discussion in industrialized countries - both in the USA, the EU and Japan - the most 
pressing question is: how can climate targets and obligations be as binding as possible and 
forced upon the emerging economies. Promises for finance on climate protection, REDD and 
adaptation have been hitherto blocked. On the one hand, ministers of the economy are hitting 
the brake whenever the economy, according to the polluter pays principle (auctioning of 
emissions rights, levies), is called upon to pick up the bill; on the other hand, finance 
ministers hit the brake whenever public money is expected to be put on the table. Both in 
Obama's climate plans in the USA and in those of the EU the issue of large-scale finance and 
technology cooperation has played a subordinate role when they are called on to do more than 
lay out the red carpet for their own economy and its exports. 
 Of course, in this kind of positioning tactical considerations play an important role. One 
doesn't want to lay one's trumps on the table without knowing what one will get from the 
others in exchange. It would be, however, infelicitous for the negotiations if block-building 
along the North-South line occurs. It would be more appropriate if leadership coalitions came 
together to overcome these 'iron curtains'. In principle, the way for a constructive solution is 
obvious. 
 Industrialized countries must accept that they have deposited by far the most greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere, that they lead in many technologies, and that they thus have an 
enormous responsibility for technology and finance cooperation. For this we need a 
combination of much increased bilateral activities as well as the establishment of new 
structures at the UNFCCC level.  
 The emerging economies and developing countries must develop their demands further: 
depending on the region (e.g., emerging economies or LDCs) and area of activity (mitigation, 
forest protection, adaptation) we are dealing with very different combinations of international 
and public support with national incentive structures, which together and on a great scale 
should redirect or unleash private streams of finance and investment. Moreover, developing 
countries need to show a willingness to negotiate on reducing their emissions below the 
                                                 
17 SUBMISSION BY FRANCE ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS 
MEMBER STATES on Enhanced action on technology development and transfer to support action on 
mitigation and adaptation supported by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey, Paris, 14 November 2008. 
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business as usual path, by committing themselves to ambitious action plans supported by the 
international community.  
 However, it would be naive to overlook the conflicts of interest standing in the way of this 
kind of solution. Industrialized countries want to accelerate and increase the export of their 
technologies to emerging economies. They expect huge growth and new markets for their 
innovative industries. The emerging economies on the other hand want to use the technology 
cooperation to gain the knowledge for their own companies to produce and market these 
technologies themselves.   
 Theoretically, it shouldn't be too difficult to navigate between these different interests. If 
we actually get an ambitious agreement, the technology revolution will come hot on its heels. 
The whole energy, transport and building sectors in industrialized and emerging economies 
will have to be reformed on short notice. This can only succeed if both the actors of the 
emerging economies and those of industrialized countries make their own contributions and 
fairly reap their own rewards. The big question is, however, how can technology cooperation, 
a massive 'joint venture', be organized such that both sides will benefit from it?  
 
This kind of international joint venture could be organized along the outlines suggested by the 
following questions: 
1) What are the national legislation acts promising success in bringing forward energy 
efficiency and renewable energies in emerging economies? 
2) What are the national legislation acts promising success in bringing forward the 
millennium development goals in the LDCs and build up the corresponding capacities, 
without thereby giving development a push along a path leading to ever more emissions? 
3) How can these pieces of national legislation be best supported and co-financed by the 
international community?  
4) How can we take consideration of the fact that, seen relatively, considerably more 
public money is needed in the LDCs than in emerging economies in order to mobilize 
private capital?  
5) Which investments in infrastructure are necessary to move the path quickly away from 
emissions-intensive and risky technologies? 
 6) Which hurdles do we have to overcome for each individual technology in order to bring 
them quickly and at scale into the market?  
 7) How can these hurdles be overcome so that: 
a) quick entry into the market is ensured? 
b) capacity is fostered for the swift and broad deployment in the relevant countries of these 
technologies?  
c) innovative companies from industrialized countries benefit from this?  
 
An important factor for the success of Copenhagen is whether it successfully frames the 
technology revolution, such that it is perceived as a joint chance and not as a competition 
threat.    
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Open Questions in – up to now project-based – Emissions Trading with Developing 
Countries 
The so-called clean development mechanism (CDM) allows industrialized countries to 
achieve a part of their emissions reductions target through projects in developing countries. 
When an industrialized country finances a windmill in India, it can add the reduction achieved 
to its own targets. In correspondence, companies or countries, which buy these reduction 
certificates, have to do less domestically. Because this was not a topic of discussion in 
Poznan, the following months will see negotiations on the big open questions that still remain.    
 In the climate and energy packet, the EU had concluded that the industry and energy 
branches can fulfil half of their emissions reduction obligations through CDM certificates – 
member states themselves are allowed to fulfil more than half via this means. Thus the 
questions on the agenda for the next few months are even more important:    
 How can it be guaranteed that the climate protection projects overseas are actually 
additional, i.e. that they wouldn't take place without the CDM? Otherwise, there will be less 
domestic climate action, although there are no additional climate actions in developing 
countries.   
 How can the conflict of interest be resolved whereby the organizations certifying the 
reductions are financed by the project developers, who have a strong interest in receiving as 
many certificates as possible?  
 How can it be ensured that nuclear power, CCS or reduced deforestation are not rewarded 
by the CDM? As was shown above, REDD should be financed by another financing 
mechanism not by integration in emissions trading. CCS seems a necessity to coal countries 
like China, India, or South America, in order to be able to achieve serious climate goals. Yet 
emissions trading cannot generate a secure incentive for retrofitting, nor would it make sense 
to position CCS – a transition technology – against the transformation to the age of solar 
power and energy efficiency. But it is true here as well: we need CCS as a complement, not 
replacement, to the rapid expansion of renewable energies. 
 How can the CDM be enhanced from bureaucratic, project-based approaches to sectoral or 
policy-based approaches – e.g. the co-financing of renewable energy laws? 
 
Beyond these technical questions, there remain two big strategic questions:  
 Firstly, the industrialized countries are insisting that developing countries finance cheap 
climate measures themselves. Through CDM – which has been constructed as a mechanism to 
seek out the cheapest climate measures – the industrialized countries would reap this "low 
hanging fruit". In the future, the instrument must be designed in a way that it concentrates on 
the middle-cost measures.   
 Secondly, climate protection can only be achieved at the scale necessary to avoid 
dangerous climate change when both industrialized countries and emerging economies 
undertake very serious action. Until now, the CDM was designed to make climate action 
possible either in developing countries or in industrialized countries. In the future, CDM 
should be developed as an incentive for additional climate action. There are two possible 
outlines. On the one hand, a developing country will say: I will reduce my emissions in this 
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sector well below the level to be expected. If I do more than this, I receive the rest financed 
through the new CDM mechanism. On the other hand, there is also the discounting option: 
two tons of reductions in a developing country can count as only one ton in a developed 
country.   
A Financing Mechanism for Technology Cooperation, Adaptation and Reduced 
Deforestation  
It seems crucial to concentrate on a large-scale and effective finance mechanism for 
adaptation in the most vulnerable countries as well as reduced deforestation, in order to thus 
focus the political debate. We must succeed in enforcing a really serious finance instrument 
and at the same time not creating a finance architecture that is too complex.  
 The auctioning of emissions rights in countries with reduction targets - as was brought into 
play by Norway - offers itself as a new kind of instrument. Countries would no longer get, 
unlike in the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period, all their emissions rights for free, but 
would rather have to pay for a portion thereof or purchase by auction. An alternative would be 
that the industrialized countries would buy their emissions rights at a fixed price. 
 The logical complement to this step would be a levy or auction of emissions rights in 
international marine and aviation, as these sectors are excluded from national budgets. After 
2012, they should not get another free climate-political 'get out of jail free card' for a second 
time after Kyoto and despite their importance for climate change.  
 
A Comprehensive Strategy to Pick up Steam through the Valley of Death  
It is to be expected that – as is normal at this kind of negotiations – a good part of the train 
ride in the coming months will be through the "valley of death". Governments take extreme 
positions in order to get the most for their own country at the end. Worries will spread that the 
climate train could go off the rails. The sluggish negotiations in Poznan gave a fore-taste of 
this phase. NGOs must break this cynical still-stand with loud public protests. For the 
international process it is essential to develop an internal as well as external strategy to bridge 
the valley of death. 
 
Internal Strategy 
The internal strategy consists of building "coalitions of the willing" to break from cover and 
tackle taboos at different levels. It is important that in the next few months a progressive 
'green group' is formed, in which a few industrialized countries (e.g. Norway, the EU, and 
Switzerland), a few emerging economies (Mexico, South Africa, Korea, China) as well as 
representatives of the small island states and LDCs cooperate. It is crucial that the USA, the 
EU and China cooperate and announce their intention to drive the process of a "great 
transformation" forward.  
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 As these lines are being written it remains unclear to what extend the USA will return to 
the international climate debate as a constructive force. Will this happen at a special summit 
for Heads of State called by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon? This could trigger the 
necessary momentum for the negotiation dynamics. 
 
External Strategy 
The external strategy focuses on building the necessary framework outside the UN for a 
breakthrough in Copenhagen.  
 The central question is: will the huge stimulus packages which are currently being 
resolved worldwide be used as a chance to fight climate change - or will infrastructure 
and technologies be supported which enwall us further in the fossil era? 
 A closely related question: will the USA, the EU and China, as the three largest 
emitters in the world, present – possibly in consultation – ambitious climate plans? 
These should at first demonstrate their readiness for domestic implementation, in 
coherence with the stimulus packages; second, demonstrate readiness for large-scale 
technology cooperation concerning energy efficiency, renewable energies, and CCS, 
and third, should galvanize the UN climate negotiations. A part of the plans should 
show what they are ready to do regardless of the outcome of Copenhagen; the other 
part should show what they are prepared to do in addition within the framework of an 
ambitious Copenhagen agreement. 
 A central switch in the track to Copenhagen will be how seriously the new US 
administration pushes their domestic climate strategy. The announcement of an 80 
percent reduction goal by 2050 (compared to 1990), stronger legislation on energy 
efficiency for cars, an emissions trading scheme with stepwise stronger targets, as well 
as a range of "green" elements in the USA’s economic plan give hope that a fully new 
dynamic will arise here. In addition, the personnel responsible for the new American 
climate policy in the different departments give hope for a new approach in the USA’s 
climate policy.    
 Climate change must be an issue for all world leaders. Copenhagen can only be a 
success by remaining constantly a key issue at all meetings at the level of the Heads of 
State and Government for the coming 12 months. The UN Secretary General Ban-Ki 
Moon wants to call two meetings of the world leaders to address climate change. The 
Obama team wants to continue the major emitters meeting initiative. It would make 
sense to rework this so that the particularly vulnerable countries (AOSIS, LDCs) are 
represented. The G8 summit in 2009 - because of its unreliable host, Berlusconi - 
provides only a very small chance for constructive work. On 12 December 2008 
before the resolution of the EU climate package, Berlusconi expressed very clearly 
what he thinks about climate change: "It is absurd, in times of a crisis to speak about 
CO2 emissions - that is like someone with pneumonia thinking about getting a perm". 
Peter Höppe from the Munich Re Group commented aptly on 14 December: "Climate 
change is more like cancer. If one doesn't do anything in time, it becomes 
unmanageable". 
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 It is emerging that at the middle of 2009 an international report on climate change as 
an enormous security risk will be published. Together with the Stern Report, which 
portrayed the economic necessity of climate protection, the clear geopolitical necessity 
can increase the pressure for serious action. As suggested by the Maldives, the UN 
Security Council should also, before Copenhagen, meet on this issue to increase 
pressure on the negotiations in Copenhagen. 
 It is important that parts of the economy, which would profit from the technological 
revolution, organize themselves and put up their hand loudly. They can only invest if 
the political signals, i.e. policies, are long, loud and legal18.   
In many of the most important countries and regions, elections will occur before Copenhagen 
(e.g. Germany, Japan, EU Parliament, India...). It is important that we succeed in forcing 
parties to make ambitious election promises on climate action and in organizing the 
appropriate public pressure.    
 The EU’s policy is becoming ever more ambivalent. In March 2007, it was leading the way 
for an international strategy to avert dangerous climate change; now there is one retreat after 
another. While the EU commission’s proposal for a European stimulus package contains clear 
approaches for the necessary transformation, these are rudimentarily reflected in most of the 
national packages – in Germany too.    
 The Energy and Climate Package agreed upon in December 2008 succeeded in avoiding a 
complete collapse of the EU climate policy, yet there were significant cutbacks in its 
effectiveness and ambition.  
 At the end of January the EU commission presented a draft for the negotiating strategy for 
the Copenhagen summit. As these lines are being written, member states are wrestling to 
"improve" (or weaken) this proposal. As relatively positive signals are coming from both 
China and the USA, the EU must approach these actors at the highest level in order to give 
the signal to break camp and get going.    
The Political Goals for An Ambitious Treaty 
In Poznan, it seemed that the international political will is insufficient to anchor the crucial 
climate-political goals in the concluding document in Copenhagen. With the financial and 
economic crisis this has not grown any easier, but at the same time new chances have arisen. 
We have to be prepared for the fact that Copenhagen will take place while global 
unemployment reaches a new peak. A really ambitious Copenhagen treaty will only have a 
chance if we succeed in understanding the necessary transformation of the building, energy 
and transport infrastructure as a chance for jobs and the economy, and at the same time for the 
global climate.   
 The new US administration is sending clear signals that it is serious with the necessary 
climate transformation. 80 years ago, the US was looking for a way out of the economic crisis 
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with the "war economy". Why shouldn’t it be the revolution into the solar energy age leading 
us out of this crisis? And this time, by averting huge-scale upheavals.   
 At the beginning of 2009, it is unlikely that German parties will bet on this chance during 
the election year. The new stimulus packages passed up to day also sound like a manifest for 
business as usual, and not like a first step for mankind into the future.    
 
An ambitious climate treaty must reach the following goals: 
 The industrialized countries must reduce their emissions by 25 to 40 percent by 2020 
compared to 1990. The vast majority of these reductions must be achieved domestically.   
 The peak of global emissions must be reached before 2020, if we are to have any chance 
of avoiding dangerous climate change.   
 In emerging economies there must be a significant deviation from business as usual. 
According to the best available studies,19 this means a deviation of 15-30 percent - parts of 
this must be externally co-financed.   
 Ambitious climate action plans in emerging economies are tied to a comprehensive 
finance and technology package, financed by industrialized countries. This cooperation 
should proceed in part through the central mechanism in the framework of the UN 
Climate Convention, in part also bilaterally.  
 Additionally, we need a plan to stop deforestation and degradation in tropical forests. 
This must be additional to the necessary climate protection in the industrialized countries 
and emerging economies and not instead of it. That means:  the industrialized countries 
co-financing this action plan cannot reduce their own targets on account of this.  
 Moreover, we need a comprehensive strategy to support the particularly vulnerable 
countries and regions with adaptation to climate change. Here we need significant 
financial means, and we must ensure that this is used to the benefit of the particularly 
vulnerable people and regions.  
 It would make sense to complement the adaptation strategy with a climate insurance 
mechanism. On the one hand, this would cover damages in the most vulnerable countries 
arising from large-scale weather catastrophes, exceeding their ability to overcome the 
disaster. A precondition would be proof of an active adaptation strategy in each 
developing country. On the other hand, it would support developing countries to establish 
micro-insurance and other insurance products against climate change. 
                                                 
19 Michel den Elzen & Niklas Höhne, Reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in Annex I and non-
Annex I countries for meeting concentration stabilisation targets, Climatic Change (2008) 91:249–274, 
DOI 10.1007/s10584-008-9484-z. 
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Conclusion 
Within the UN negotiations we are currently heading towards a scenario, which will condemn 
current and future generations to unconscionable risks. However, there are new and very 
positive impulses – from the USA, South Africa, and increasingly China and the Least 
Developed Countries. Compared internationally, the EU climate package is very ambitious, 
but too little to achieve the climate goals it has set for itself. Without improvements it will 
join those positions paving the way for an unacceptable path to a temperature rise of much 
more than two degrees. Enormous risks will threaten the whole earth. And for many small 
island states the countdown to disappearance will begin. It would be a unique event in the 
history of mankind if this occurs before our eyes yet without any military intent.   
 The next months, with their many hours of climate negotiations and accompanying 
additional international high level meetings, must be used to achieve a path breaking treaty. 
This must be sufficiently concrete so that the ratification process can begin and be completed 
in time before 2013. The countries will not be ready to buy a pig in a poke. The agreement 
must thus be far more detailed than the Kyoto Protocol. Whether worldwide stimulus 
packages will be used to lead the climate turnaround will be an important pre-decision for a 
watershed agreement in Copenhagen.   
 After Copenhagen we must carefully weigh up the results of the agreement. In particular 
we must reform or form the institutions necessary, which can be developed to a really 
effective global environment organization, with the power to act and sanction as it may be 
needed.  
 We must also clarify which institutions could tackle the systemic risks, arising from 
climate change as well as reaction thereto, be it for financial markets, or for human, national 
and international security: the much-cited report of the former Chief Economist of the World 
Bank, Lord Nicholas Stern, has taught one thing: as soon as the current financial and 
economic crisis is surmounted, climate chance could become the trigger for the next great 
financial and economic crisis. We are well advised to act decisive to guard against this.     
 
Further information 
More detailed background information and assessments by Germanwatch:  
 Briefing Paper: Bali, Poznan, Copenhagen – Triple Jump Towards a new Quality of Climate 
Policy? (Feb. 2008) 
www.germanwatch.org/klima/bapocoe.htm 
 Briefing Paper: Climate change Adaptation in Poznan: moving forward on short and long-term 
action? (Nov. 2008) 
www.germanwatch.org/klima/adpoz08e.htm 
 Discussion Paper: Climate Insurance as part of a Post-Kyoto Adaptation Strategy (Oct. 2008) 
www.germanwatch.org/klima/insur08.htm 
 Germanwatch website on the climate summit 
 www.germanwatch.org/cop 
